Pope Leo XIV on Company Profit: Where Does the Structure of Sin Live?

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Pope Leo XIV on Company Profit: Where Does the Structure of Sin Live?
Pope Leo XIV, UCA, Argentina, November 2026

A commentary on the Pope’s recent address

Pope Leo XIV told workers, businessmen, union leaders and representatives of social organizations in UCA (Universidad Católica Argentina) that a company governed by profit as its sole criterion becomes “a structure of sin that generates exclusion.”[1]

Many read it as a verdict on capitalism but the speech itself says otherwise. In the same address the Pope called business a noble vocation when it is guided by the social function of property and capital, acknowledged that entrepreneurs often risk their own patrimony to create jobs, reaffirmed the right to private property, and proposed as a model a businessman, the Venerable Enrique Shaw. The sentence about sin is conditional: it describes what a company becomes if profit is the only measure. And it’s also important, where a free-market reading agrees with Leo XIV and where it truly parts ways with him.

The Pope, before business leaders and unions in Argentina: profit as the sole criterion turns the company into a «structure of sin» – INFOVATICANA
Pope Leo XIV, at UCA: when profit is the sole criterion of success, the company becomes dehumanized and turns into a "structure of sin".

What a structure of sin is

If we understand the structure of sin as a moral framework with purely human roots, independent of capitalism, we can see how one might shift from a virtuous cycle of wealth creation to a vicious one without any implication of capitalism itself.

John Paul (JP) II introduced in Sollicitudo rei socialis (1987, nos. 36 and 37), where such structures are described as rooted in personal sin and “always linked to the concrete acts of individuals” who introduce them, consolidate them and make them hard to remove. According JP II, two attitudes typically build them: the all-consuming desire for profit and the thirst for power. The magisterium itself therefore locates the origin of the structure in persons, and the institution can reproduce and reinforce the behavior that originally created them.

When Leo XIV said that profit as the sole criterion turns a company into a “structure of sin”, he did not say that exploitation or a zero-sum game is all that wealth creation can offer. A system can become the vehicle of human moral failure without being the source or constitutive cause of that failure.

Centesimus annus (1991) makes the same cut from the other side. In no. 35 JP II accepts profit as a legitimate indicator that a business is functioning well and adds that it cannot be the only one, because the books may be in order while the people who make up the firm are humiliated. In no. 42 he separates two meanings of “capitalism”: an economy that recognizes the positive role of business, the market, private property and free human creativity receives an affirmative answer; an economic freedom with no juridical framework placing it at the service of human freedom as a whole receives a negative one. Leo XIV’s recent sentence sits squarely inside that distinction.

The bad approach involves the tendency to accumulate out of sheer inertia, driven by the fear of loss. Steve Jobs once remarked that being the richest man in the cemetery did not matter to him, if a millionaire entrepreneur and employer in this line of thought would add: what really matters is the love of creativity in wealth creation. Conceiving new ideas to generate more and more wealth would serve to fuel a virtuous cycle once again. And in that cycle one can better serve other people.

On the human side of accumulating wealth without any moral view, cronyism is real, workplace abuse is real, and illegal labor practices, coercive arrangements and predatory corporate behavior are just as real.

The crucial distinction is between something being systemically reproduced and something being structurally necessary. A practice can become systemic without being logically or economically necessary to capitalism. For example, a particular corporate governance model may institutionalize excessive shareholder primacy. That does not establish that private ownership, capital accumulation or voluntary exchange necessarily require that model. Likewise, a union can institutionalize rent-seeking without demonstrating that collective labor representation is inherently rent-seeking.

What could not be real is the theory that these phenomena constitute the engine of wealth creation, or that they are intrinsic features of voluntary exchange itself. The critics very often have correctly identified several pathologies, but they have systematically misidentified their causes.

A structure of sin should not be confused with the economic system within which it develops. We can institutionalize the moral failures, turning individual decisions into organizational practices and eventually into arrangements that reproduce themselves beyond the intentions of any particular participant. This phenomenon is neither exclusive to capitalism nor evidence that the economic principles of private property, voluntary exchange and capital formation necessarily produce it. Greed can inhabit a corporation, a union, a political party or a public administration. The relevant distinction is between the institutionalization of a human vice and the constitutive logic of the institution in which it takes place.

The strongest objection

If competition punishes the firm that fails to maximize, then profit as the sole criterion looks like an incentive the system itself produces, and the distinction between human vice and systemic logic becomes too comfortable.

Competition constrains results and leaves motives open. A firm must cover its costs and serve its customers to survive; nothing in that requirement dictates that every decision be ranked by a single number. Firms with very different cultures coexist in the same markets for decades. Where the single criterion becomes compulsory, the cause is usually a specific governance arrangement (the shareholder primacy model mentioned above is one), and arrangements of that kind are chosen, defended and reformable. The objection does land here: the more a market rewards short-term extraction, the costlier virtue becomes. That is a reason to examine the rules of the game, which is what the rest of this article does.

Zero-sum thinking

The zero-sum bias leads to the conflation of business profit with exclusion; this point is cultural. Zero-sum thinking may well be a human cognitive default: our ancestral environment really was near zero-sum (fixed land, fixed game, one tribe’s gain was another’s loss), and the instinct never left us.

It was perfectly rational for someone like Montaigne (the brilliant writer and Feudal Lord) to write in 1580 that the profit of one is the damage of another, but the world he described (pure feudalism) no longer exists…

Recent empirical work by Chinoy, Nunn, Sequeira and Stantcheva (“Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences,” American Economic Review, vol. 116, no. 3, March 2026, pp. 1052-1096) shows that the zero-sum mindset is measurable and a strong predictor of support for redistribution. The authors trace the mindset to lived and inherited experience (low upward mobility, a family history without immigration, ancestral exposure to enslavement), which makes it an understandable reading of a world where gains really did come at someone’s expense.

The same mindset also predicts support for restrictive immigration policy, and it cuts across party lines. People think in zero-sum terms where the exits they knew were closed.

Exploitation, monopsony or just wage?

The other ghost is exploitation. Value flows from consumer to factor, not from labor to value. Labor enters the price as a derived magnitude, never as its source or measure. Maybe Marx ran the arrow the wrong way here.

Not many rigorous critics in 2026 actually defend the Labor Theory of Value (LTV). A stronger academic argument for “exploitation” is monopsony. The claim, in the work of Azar and Marinescu (“Monopsony Power in the Labor Market,” Handbook of Labor Economics, 2024), is that where employers have labor-market power, wages can sit below a worker’s marginal product. This is a real phenomenon. Is monopsony what Pope Leo criticizes?

The Pope’s own tradition argues from a different premise, the doctrine of the just-wage. In Rerum novarum (1891, no. 45), which Leo XIV recalled at the Argentine UCA, Leo XIII accepts that wages are set by free agreement and then adds a limit older than any contract: the wage must be enough to support a frugal and upright worker, and a worker who accepts harsher terms out of necessity or fear is the victim of force. This is the serious rival to the symmetry I defend in the next paragraph, and it deserves to be met on its own ground.

The mere fact that an employer seeks to pay the lowest wage compatible with retaining labor is not, by itself, exploitation. It is structurally analogous to the worker seeking the highest possible wage, or the consumer seeking the lowest possible price. All three reflect the same underlying logic of voluntary exchange under conditions of scarcity: each participant attempts to maximize subjective advantage within the constraints of competition. At this point, there is symmetry but not yet abuse.

Monopsony arises precisely when one side’s bargaining position stops being checked by the other; when the worker cannot credibly walk away. Here monopsony could be condemned by Pope Leo. Here, too, the two vocabularies meet as Leo XIII’s worker who accepts out of necessity or fear is the economist’s worker whose exit is blocked. A difference remains and should be stated: Catholic teaching sets a floor of justice that holds whatever the market says, while my argument in this article trusts open exit to do most of that work.

That asymmetry is contingent, not structural; it depends on barriers to worker mobility and to employer entry, many of which (occupational licensing, non-competes, zoning that restricts where firms and workers can locate) are themselves state-created.

Many, though not all. The monopsony literature also finds employer power arising from search frictions, differences between jobs and the plain cost of moving, with no statute involved. A worker without savings does not leave as easily as a firm replaces him. Open competition is therefore a necessary condition for the exit to work, and I do not claim it is always a sufficient one[2].

Monopsony, employers and minimun wages (Youtube)

The free market can make peace with Leo XIV if it can keep the exit open. Competition is one of the main cures because a firm paying below productivity creates a clean profit opportunity for a rival to enter, bid the worker away, and capture the margin. This is also where the argument earns its falsifiability: the market would indeed stand convicted if abuse persisted systematically under conditions of open competition and free exit. The test can be run: wage markdowns should shrink wherever entry and mobility become freer, and if they persist with the exit open, the free-market reading owes a concession. Where these mechanisms are obstructed, whether by private concentration or political privilege, the disciplinary capacity of the market diminishes.

Markets don’t automatically correct every abuse. The point is that competitive exchange contains a corrective mechanism that institutional monopolies and politically protected arrangements can suppress.

In a normally competitive labor market, an employer who persistently mistreats workers will generally lose those whose skills and productivity are sufficiently valued elsewhere. When this does not happen here may be monopsony power, legal barriers, government-backed privileges, or a broader economic downturn that deprives workers of alternatives. But absent such conditions, the persistence of mistreatment does not establish a structural feature of capitalism: it may reflect an employer who chooses to behave abusively, and a worker whose marketable skills or productivity do not command a sufficiently attractive alternative offer. A worker may understandably choose to remain, particularly during a national economic crisis or because of family responsibilities. That decision does not, by itself, transform an individual moral failure

The main question is not “does the firm want to pay less?”; of course it does but competition prevents the unfair wage, as the worker naturally wants to earn more. The question again is who is blocking the exit. If an employer blocks the exit, that is the individual choice of the vicious cycle of wealth creation that I mentioned earlier. When the blockage becomes structural, the question shifts to the institutions that create or preserve it. Sometimes these are state-imposed restrictions; sometimes they arise from private concentration; frequently the two reinforce one another.

Occupational licensing, compliance barriers that only incumbents can afford, targeted subsidies, tariffs and restrictive zoning are not market features. They are state instruments captured by insiders[3].

The Pope of course is right to condemn every kind of psychological harassment, humiliation, mobbing, or ordinary cruelty in firms. These are individuals exercising bad authority. But they are not unique products of capitalism; they emerge wherever authority exists: corporations, unions, universities, bureaucracies, political parties, and states alike. Their existence is evidence about human nature, not about an economic law.

Coercion, fraud, and illegal labor practices are genuine violations, but they are violations in the market framework, not expressions of it. The remedy is enforcement of the rules of voluntary exchange, not their abolition. Labor unions or the State are not the privileged moral corrective to business; they should be evaluated by the same criteria as businesses: whether they protect individual freedom, preserve accountability, and resist the concentration of power, and whether they can correct the asymmetric relation between employer and employee.

On this point the Pope’s speech gives the argument unexpected support. He asked the unions to reach the workers who have no voice (the precarious, the informal, the excluded). A union that represents only those already inside the formal system is an insider arrangement, and the Pope’s request reads as a criticism of it.

Parting ways: where my real disagreement lies

Several passages of the UCA speech press against the free-market reading.

About Property: The Pope reaffirmed private property and attached to it a social obligation: owners are custodians of goods destined for everyone. My view is that stewardship describes a moral duty of the owner, and that it becomes a different claim when it is turned into a title for third parties to administer what isn’t their own property.

About Employment. He said that depriving a person of work wounds their dignity, and that access to work should be a priority of public policy and a test of any development model. The first half is common ground but the second is where the discussion starts, because policies that protect existing jobs can close the door to the jobs that do not exist yet, and a large informal sector is what that closed door looks like.

About Labor as a commodity. He asked unions to resist treating labor as a commodity. Earlier I wrote that labor enters the price as a derived magnitude, and the two statements need to be reconciled. Price theory explains how a wage is formed. It is silent on what a person is owed as a person, and Laborem exercens (1981) places that question first when it affirms the priority of labor over capital. I hold both: the wage is a price, and the worker is never only a factor.

About Artificial intelligence. He warned that unregulated AI and automation could endanger many jobs and said that algorithms cannot replace human judgment. This is the passage closest to the work of this blog and a former paper. The question it opens is institutional: who answers for an automated decision, and under what rules.

The public evidence makes reasonable to deduce that the worker is not a victim of structural extraction, but a participant in a capital structure that multiplies his marginal productivity far beyond what an uncapitalized labor market could offer. That some participants are mistreated by bad actors is a moral problem to be solved; that is the place where the Pope’s teachings have a huge margin to enter.

Enrique Shaw

The businessman the Pope held up as a model was the illustrious Argentine entrepreneur Enrique Shaw. He understood that the creation of value (which generates wealth and jobs) does not conflict with virtue; rather, a business should strive to ensure that what strengthens society also serves as a source of stability and prosperity.

Shaw ran Cristalerías Rigolleau, was a founder of the Christian Association of Business Leaders (ACDE) and one of the promoters of the UCA itself. In 1961 the majority shareholder, Corning Glass Works, ordered the dismissal of some 1,200 of the plant’s workers. Shaw, already ill with cancer, opposed the order, proposed a plan to keep them and told the shareholders he would resign if it was carried out. The jobs were kept. He used to say that unemployment was a moral evil before it was an economic one.

The episode serves both readings and I prefer to say so. It shows an executive refusing profit as the sole criterion, which is the Pope’s point. It also shows that he did it from inside the firm, by persuading its owners, with no decree and no outside authority, which is mine. It’s a concrete example of how individual moral agency can change the behavior of an institution without requiring us to idealize the institution itself.

Conclusion

When the Pope tells us that greed is the fundamental problem with businesses (producing while forgetting to satisfy the needs of others and failing to respect them), he is speaking of the moral dimension, and the text of his speech confirms that he does not condemn capitalism itself. The Pope has identified a genuine human and institutional problem, and an explanation must be located carefully even when you don’t agree with the whole economic conception.

The temptation to accumulate, dominate and instrumentalize other people predates capitalism and survives outside it. Capitalism can accommodate these tendencies, as can other institutional systems; it does not follow that they define its economic logic.

The agreement with Leo XIV is therefore wider than the headlines suggested, and the disagreements that remain (the reach of the social function of property, the role of public policy in employment, the floor of the just wage) are the ones worth arguing about.

Sources:

Leo XIV, address at the Catholic University of Argentina, Buenos Aires, 9 November 2026 (text at vatican.va; reported by InfoVaticana, 11 November 2026, and Forbes Argentina, 10 November 2026).

John Paul II, Sollicitudo rei socialis (1987), nos. 36-37; Centesimus annus (1991), nos. 35 and 42; Laborem exercens (1981), no. 12.

Leo XIII, Rerum novarum (1891), no. 45.

Chinoy, Nunn, Sequeira and Stantcheva, “Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences,” American Economic Review 116(3), 2026, pp. 1052-1096.

Azar and Marinescu, “Monopsony Power in the Labor Market,” Handbook of Labor Economics, 2024. Manning, Monopsony in Motion, 2003. Card, “Who Set Your Wage?”, American Economic Review, 2022.

Stigler (1971), Tullock (1967), Krueger (1974), as cited in the text.

 

References:


[1] Leo XIV also identifies another explicitly structural danger that is not present in this article: the domination of a few over the work community. Concentrated power can distort the relationship between capital and labor even without an explicit act of individual coercion. But the existence of such concentration does not, by itself, establish that it is inherent in private ownership or voluntary exchange. The relevant question is how that concentration arises and how it is maintained. The institutional arrangements that sustain it aren’t necessary features of the market but contingent forms of power accumulation.

[2] Manning, Monopsony in Motion, 2003; Card, “Who Set Your Wage?”, American Economic Review, 2022.

[3] George Stigler’s “The Theory of Economic Regulation” (Bell Journal, 1971) showed that regulation is typically acquired by the industry it governs and operated for its benefit; Tullock (1967) and Krueger (1974) gave us the vocabulary of rent-seeking. Authentic entrepreneurs win by satisfying consumers. Rent-seekers win by legal exclusion; in this case the structural trap was never the market. The deeper trap is the captured state, and the lock is sold to the highest bidder.

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